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Abstract—Blockchain, the technology behind the popular Bit-
coin, is considered a “security by design” system as it is meant to
create security among a group of distrustful parties yet without
a central trusted authority. The security of blockchain relies on
the premise of honest-majority, namely, the blockchain system
is assumed to be secure as long as the majority of consensus
voting power is honest. And in the case of proof-of-work (PoW)
blockchain, adversaries cannot control more than 50% of the
network’s gross computing power. However, this 50% threshold is
based on the analysis of computing power only, with implicit and
idealistic assumptions on the network and node behavior. Recent
researches have alluded that factors such as network connectivity,
presence of blockchain forks, and mining strategy could under-
mine the consensus security assured by the honest-majority, but
neither concrete analysis nor quantitative evaluation is provided.
In this paper we fill the gap by proposing an analytical model
to assess the impact of network connectivity on the consensus
security of PoW blockchain under different adversary models.
We apply our analytical model to two adversarial scenarios:
1) honest-but-potentially-colluding, 2) selfish mining. For each
scenario, we quantify the communication capability of nodes
involved in a fork race and estimate the adversary’s mining
revenue and its impact on security properties of the consensus
protocol. Simulation results validated our analysis. Our modeling
and analysis provide a paradigm for assessing the security impact
of various factors in a distributed consensus system.
Index Terms—Blockchain, consensus security, network model-
ing
I. INTRODUCTION
Decentralization is a foundational principle for blockchain
technology and distributed ledger system. Envisioned by
Nakamoto, the pseudonymous creator of Bitcoin [1], and
later advocates, blockchain technology is secure-by-design and
enables mutually distrustful parties to securely curate a shared
blockchain through distributed consensus without relying on
a central authority for bootstrapping the trust. Driven by
incentives, consensus participants act in their self-interest to
maximize rewards. Under such decentralized zero-trust setting,
the security of distributed consensus relies on the premise of
honest-majority, i.e. honest parties always control the majority
of gross voting power in the consensus process, and in the
case of proof-of-work (PoW) based blockchains, 50% of gross
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computing (or “mining”) power [2]. This threshold is widely
used for evaluating the risk of mining centralization in Bitcoin
and Ethereum [3], [4], [5], [6].
However, the consensus security from honest-majority
comes with two implicit assumptions. First, all nodes have
the same communication capability, i.e. propagating infor-
mation throughout the network equally fast. Second, dur-
ing a blockchain fork race, wherein several blocks of the
same height compete for one place in the blockchain, all
competitors have the equal chance of being the winner. In
practice, the quality of connections often differ significantly
across different network regions, as has been demonstrated
by various measurements [6], [7], [8], [9]. Those residing
in a highly connected cluster can disseminate blocks faster
than those in a less connected region. This communication
advantage translates into a higher chance of dominating a
fork race, and has nontrivial consequence in the security of
distributed consensus. As a result of this network advantage,
the adversary will no longer require 50% of gross mining
power to undermine the consensus security.
Following this observation, various blockchain scaling pro-
posals and security analyses [10], [11], [12] have identified
the positive correlation between high blockchain fork rate and
weak consensus security. These works generally adopt the
honest-but-potentially-colluding threat model, in which any
size of honest miners can join the collusion to compromise
consensus security. Specifically, colluding miners seek to
dominate the fork races with honest miners and achieve unfair
mining gains. As a result, the colluding miners require less
than 50% of gross mining power to break the consensus.
However, these security analyses are largely qualitative and
do not look into the impact of the actual network connectivity
or information propagation dynamics.
The security impact of information propagation dynamics in
Bitcoin was studied quantitatively at the macro level in [13]. It
proposes a probabilistic model that estimates the average fork
rate of the Bitcoin blockchain based on the measurement of
how an average block propagates in the network. The authors
then regard fork rate as a security measure of the blockchain
network. However, their model still assumes all miners have
equal communication capability and equal chance of winning
fork races, and does not consider the impact of heterogeneous
network connectivity. It also does not provide a concrete case
of how an adversary may exploit blockchain forks.
Another line of research focuses on adversarial strategies for
selfish colluding parties [14], [15], [16], [17]. In selfish min-
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2Fig. 1. Proposed analytical model.
ing [14], an adversary with superior communication capability
can achieve unfair mining gains by strategically withholding
and releasing blocks. It proactively creates blockchain forks
that nullify the efforts of honest nodes. Although these works
take into account the difference in fork winning chance be-
tween the adversary and honest miners, their analyses treat
the adversary’s communication capability as a preexisting
parameter (denoted by γSM ) rather than deriving it from
the actual network connectivity profile. How the expansion
process of selfish mining pool in the network affects its
communication capability and overall consensus security is
also an important issue but overlooked in the literature.
Recognizing the lack of quantitative analysis on the security
of distributed consensus from a network perspective, in this
paper we fill the gap by proposing a novel analytical model
to assess the impact of network connectivity on the security
of PoW-based blockchain consensus systems. An overview of
our analytical model is given in Figure 1. The model captures
network connectivity by a graph representation of the peer-
to-peer network, and evaluates each node’s communication
capability from its network location and the adversary setting.
The communication capability measures, combined with the
consensus protocol specification and two other digests namely
the information propagation dynamics and mining power dis-
tribution, are then used to quantitatively evaluate the security
properties of the blockchain system.
The main contributions of this paper include:
• We propose a novel analytical model to assess the impact
of network connectivity on consensus security of PoW
blockchain. In a nutshell, the model quantifies the com-
munication capability of nodes involved in a fork race
and derives the distribution of mining revenue, which is
used for evaluating blockchain consensus security.
• We apply the analytical model to two adversarial scenar-
ios, namely honest-but-potentially-colluding and selfish
mining, and demonstrate that the lack of or excessively
heterogeneous network connectivity leads to poor con-
sensus security.
• We performed a thorough simulation experiment on PoW
blockchain for each adversarial scenario. The simulation
result matches the model prediction and validates our
security analysis.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PoW Blockchain and Distributed Consensus
In public blockchain systems exemplified by Bitcoin, all
networked miner nodes (“nodes” hereafter) work to curate a
unified transaction history through distributed consensus. The
transaction history is recorded in a chain of blocks in which
every block contains a certain number of recently produced
transactions. Every node seeks to generate the next block of
the blockchain via a proof-of-work (PoW) process, namely, by
finding an input to a cryptographic hash function that yields
an output less than a target value. The input (i.e. the “proof”)
is attached in the block header. New blocks are disseminated
immediately to the network via peer-to-peer gossiping. All
nodes reach consensus on only one block at each blockchain
height according to the “longest-chain rule”: choosing the
chain with the highest valid block. Generation of the next
block is aimed at prolonging the longest chain, which shall
always contain the most computational effort. Theoretically,
as long as the majority computing power is controlled by
honest nodes, the distributed consensus achieves probabilistic
finality in that an accepted block could be discarded but with
exponentially diminishing probability as the blockchain grows
[18], [19]. The above scheme is also known as Nakamoto
Consensus, for its origin in the Bitcoin white paper [1].
In practical blockchain network, consensus security is com-
plicated by blockchain forks. Blockchain fork is a scenario
that multiple blocks of the same height are propagating in
the network simultaneously. Under the assumption that all
nodes are honest and follow the consensus rules, blockchain
fork is caused by block propagation delays in that node j
may generate a competing block before being aware of the
existence of node i’s block of the same height. To resolve
blockchain fork, the longest-chain rule dictates that whichever
fork branch gets appended with a new block should be chosen;
blocks in other branches are then discarded. In the presence of
forks, the honest-majority premise can still ensure consensus
security, under an assumption that all competing blocks in a
fork have the equal chance of being the winner [2].
B. Network Connectivity’s Impact on Consensus Security
Due to heterogeneous connectivity of the underlying peer-
to-peer network, the equal-chance fork winning assumption
does not hold true. A well-connected node, say node i, tends
to have superior communication capability that allows it to
disseminate information faster than a less-connected node, say
node j. If node i generates a new block, it takes a shorter time
for node i to propagate this block across the whole network
and the rest of the network has a lower chance of generating a
competing block. If node j generates a competing block before
node i’s block reaches j, node i’s communication advantage
can still cause a larger share of the network to follow its
block, which gives node i a higher chance of winning the
fork eventually. As a result, in the long run, well-connected
nodes yield higher mining revenue than what is expected from
their share of computing power. This discrepancy between the
long-term mining revenue and the actual computing power of
a node implies the possibility that a group of well-connected
3nodes with a minority fraction of computing power can harvest
more than 50% of gross mining revenue, which renders the
security from the honest-majority premise vulnerable.
Besides exploiting naturally occurred forks, a well-
connected adversary can achieve significantly higher mining
gains by proactively creating forks. Selfish mining [14] is one
prominent example. Unlike an honest miner who publishes
new block immediately after generation, a selfish mining at-
tacker withholds newly generated blocks in a private chain, and
strategically releases the private chain to the network whenever
he sees his private chain’s lead over the public chain decreases
to a threshold. The blockchain forks caused by the attacker’s
strategic private chain releases nullify the mining effort of
honest nodes and create opportunities for the attacker to profit
from its communication advantage. The detailed selfish mining
strategy and the communication advantage parameter γSM will
be introduced in Section V.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model and Consensus Protocol
We consider a peer-to-peer network of N nodes represented
by an undirected graph G = (V,E) and its adjacency matrix
A. Aij = 1 indicates node i, j share a peer relationship
and can communicate in one hop. The PoW process and
consensus based on the longest-chain-rule are modeled as
follows. To model the output randomness of the cryptographic
hash function used for PoW, we assume each node i generates
new blocks according to Poisson process of rate pii per time
unit δ. Block generation of the whole network is characterized
by the merged Poisson process of rate pi =
∑
i pii. Our model
does not adjust mining difficulty. We consider a fixed set of
consensus participants with fixed block generation rate.
Once some node i generates blocki(h) of blockchain height
h, it disseminates blocki(h) throughout the network via peer-
to-peer gossiping. Other nodes decide on the acceptance of
blocki(h) according to the longest-chain rule. That is, if
another node k sees blocki(h) while its local blockchain has
already accepted blockj(h) from node j and j 6= i, it declares
a fork at height h and stops propagating blocki(h). Conversely,
if another node l sees blocki(h) before blockj(h), it declares
a fork at height h and stops propagating blockj(h). Once the
two competing blocks completely stop propagating and the
network partitions into two factions each of which advocates
one block, we call this situation a fork stalemate. And the
two blocks are partially propagated. A fork stalemate can
be resolved by a new block of height h + 1 subscribing
either blocki(h) or blockj(h) and being fully propagated in
the network.
As for the finalization of blockchain, we consider the
blockchain canonized by height h if a block of any origin
block∗(h) gets fully propagated in the network without en-
countering any competing block. We define the completion of
block∗(h)’s propagation as a canonization event. Essentially,
a canonization event at height h rejuvenates the PoW process
as if the past forks and competitions never happened. Figure 2
shows an example for blockchain canonization and fork stale-
mate events. Note that the canonization concept is different
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Network and Model Parameters
G The graph representation of the node network.
N Number of nodes in G.
A The adjacency matrix of G.
δ Timeslot, also the time unit.
pi Block generation rate of the entire network (δ−1).
pii Block generation rate of node i (δ−1).
piSM Block generation rate of the selfish mining pool (δ−1)
Analyses
Ui(t) Set of nodes unaware of node i’s block at time t since its
generation. |Ui(t)| is the cardinality of Ui(t).
|Ui(t)|pi Combined block generation rate of nodes in Ui(t).
PNC,i(t) Probability of the rest miners not proposing a competing
block by time t of i’s block’s propagation.
h(c) Blockchain height of the cth canonization event
τij(t) Minimum time for node i’s block to reach j starting at
time t from the generation of i’s block.
ωij(t) Node i’s likelihood to win the fork race against node j if
j publishes a competing block at time t from node i’s
block’s generation. ωˆij(t) is an estimation.
γSM Selfish mining pool’s communication capability, i.e. the
average fraction of honest mining power that will advocate
the pool’s block after it releases private chain.
MRi Mining revenue of node i as % of total canonized blocks.
RMGi Relative mining gain of node i. RMGi =
MRi−pii/pi
pii/pi
.
Security Metrics
FR Average fork rate of the whole network.
AT50 50%-attack threshold, i.e. minimum fraction of computing
power controlled by adversarial nodes whose combined MR
exceeds 50% of the total.
PRTH Profitability threshold, i.e. fraction of computing power
controlled by the selfish mining pool when it first achieves
positive RMG during its expansion.
Fig. 2. An example for blockchain canonization and fork stalemate events.
Width of a block denotes its propagation period.
from the probabilistic finality of Nakamoto Consensus, which
considers consensus security a probabilistic measure. We will
use canonization events as embedding points to estimate the
mining revenue of each node in the Section IV.
B. Adversary Model
1) Honest-but-Potentially-Colluding: This adversarial sce-
nario characterizes the practical case of the well-known 50%
attack. All nodes operate honestly by default, but the top
miners can potentially collude so that their combined mining
revenue (MR) exceeds 50% of the total. In our analysis, a
4well-connected node may obtain positive relative mining gain
(RMG) and collude with other well-connected nodes. The
mining revenue of a node can be viewed as its “enhanced
mining power” in contrast to its raw computing power. In this
scenario we are interested in the 50%-attack threshold (AT50),
i.e. the minimum fraction of computing power controlled by
adversarial nodes whose combined MR exceeds 50% of the
total.
2) Selfish Mining: This adversarial scenario assumes there
are a pool of nodes in the network performing the selfish
mining strategy described in [14]. We treat the selfish mining
pool as a colluding consortium that expands among honest
nodes. As the pool expands, it acquires the colluding nodes’
computing power and external communication links. In this
scenario, AT50 denotes the fraction of computing power
controlled by the pool when the pool first achieves 50% of
total MR during its expansion. We are also interested in the
pool’s profitability threshold (PRTH), which is the fraction of
computing power controlled by the pool when it first achieves
a positive RMG.
IV. ANALYSIS ON HONEST MINING
In this section we calculate the impact of network connec-
tivity on blockchain fork rate and mining revenue distribution
under the honest mining assumption. We then discuss the
security provision under the honest-but-potentially-colluding
adversarial scenario.
A. Fork Rate
Define Mi as the event that node i is the first to generate
the next block at an arbitrary moment of no outstanding
blockchain fork. Denote the time for node i to find a block
by random variable Ti. Then Ti ∼ exponential(pii) and
P (Mi) = P{Ti < Tj ,∀j 6= i} = pii
pi
(1)
which can be conveniently derived from properties of Poisson
processes. To facilitate the ensuing analysis, we consider the
physical time slotted into basic time units of δ.
Let the moment when event Mi happens be time 0. Denote
Ui(t) the set of nodes unaware of node i’s block at time t,
and |Ui(t)|pi the combined block generation rate of Ui(t).
We have |Ui(0)|pi = pi−pii and |Ui(t)|pi = 0 when t exceeds
the minimum time needed for i’s block to reach all nodes.
The probability that the rest of network does not generate a
competing block by time t can be written as:
PNC,i(t) =
t∏
s=δ
(
1− |Ui(s)|pi
)
(2)
Since (1 − |Ui(s)|M )ts=δ is a positive increasing sequence
bounded by 1, thus (PNC,i(t))∞t=δ is a convergent sequence.
Then by the law of total probability, the average blockchain
fork rate of the whole network is obtained by weighing (1−
limt→∞ PNC,i(t)) with P (Mi),∀i:
FR =
∑
i
P (Mi)
(
1− lim
t→∞PNC,i(t)
)
=
∑
i
pii
pi
(
1−
∞∏
s=δ
(
1− |Ui(s)|pi
)) (3)
If pi  1, N is large (e.g. pi=1/600, N≈10, 000 in Bitcoin),
mining power and network connectivity are evenly distributed,
then ∀i we have pii = piN , |Ui(s)|pi = piN |Ui(t)| = pi · ur(t)
wherein ur(t) denotes the average ratio of nodes uninformed
of a new block at time t since its generation. Further assuming
δ → 0, (3) reduces into the following form:
FR ≈ 1−
(
1− pi
)∫∞
0
ur(t)dt
(4)
which is consistent with the average fork rate obtained by [13].
The approximation (1− ax) ≈ (1− x)a for small x is used.
B. Mining Revenue and Relative Mining Gain
Define a discrete-time random process {Bi(h)}h=1,2,... in
which Bi(h) = 1 if node i is the block generator at height h
in the canonized blockchain; 0 otherwise. The mining revenue
MRi and relative mining gain RMGi of node i in the long
term are defined as follows:
MRi = lim
H→∞
1
H
H∑
h=1
Bi(h) (5)
RMGi =
MRi − pii/pi
pii/pi
(6)
Next we propose an estimation method for MRi via
probabilistic analysis. Define another discrete-time random
process {Wi(c)}c=1,2,..., which is embedded right after each
blockchain canonization event. Therefore there is no outstand-
ing fork nor propagating block in the network when random
variables Wi(c)|c=1,2,... are evaluated. We further define h(c)
as the blockchain height of the cth canonization event and
Wi(c) =
{
1 if Bi(h(c) + 1) = 1
0 otherwise
(7)
Next we argue that the expectation of Wi(c) at any epoch c,
denoted E[Wi], can be used to estimate MRi in a conservative
manner.
Proposition 1: Wi(c)|c=1,2,... are independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) and their common expectation E[Wi]
satisfies the following relation with MRi:
E[Wi]
{
≤MRi if E[Wi] ≥ piipi
> MRi otherwise
(8)
In other words, E[Wi]− piipi is a conservative estimate of the
mining gain/loss of node i. Moreover, the gap between E[Wi]
and MRi tightens as the overall fork rate FR decreases.
A proof sketch: Since {Wi(c)}c=1,2,... is embedded right
after each blockchain canonization event when all previous
forks are pruned and block propagation ceases, the competition
for future blocks is oblivious of past block competitions.
And block generation at each node is a memoryless process.
Therefore, random variables Wi(c)|c=1,2,... are i.i.d and share
a common expectation, denoted E[Wi].
For an arbitrary canonization interval c→ c+1, we consider
the blocks within it: those of height h(c)+1, ..., h(c+1). First,
pii
pi evaluates the chance of i being the first to generate a block.
E[Wi] >
pii
pi implies that i has a communication advantage
5over the network average which brings it positive mining gain.
If E[Wi] > piipi and i wins block h(c) + 1, it will continue
with an enhanced communication advantage for the current
fork race and have a higher chance of winning the subsequent
blocks from h(c) + 2 to h(c+ 1). Conversely, if E[Wi] < piipi
and i does not win block h(c)+1, the chance for i to win any
block from height h(c)+2 to h(c+1) further decreases because
of its aggravated communication disadvantage. Since Wi(c)
only considers the first block after canonization event c, using
E[Wi] to estimate MRi implies that i would have an equal
chance of winning any block from h(c) + 2 to h(c + 1) just
as winning h(c)+1. Therefore, E[Wi] tends to underestimate
(or overestimate) MRi if E[Wi] > (or <) piipi .
On the positive side, if the fork rate decreases, so is the
number of blocks h(c + 1) − h(c) within the canonization
interval c → c + 1. That is, there will be fewer blocks in a
fork incident for E[Wi] to under-/overestimate MRi, and thus
the former can achieve higher estimation accuracy.
Next we derive E[Wi]. By the law of total expectation:
E[Wi] = P (Mi)E[Wi|Mi] +
∑
j 6=i
P (Mj)E[Wi|Mj ] (9)
We separated the summation because the two conditional
events Wi|Mi and Wi|Mj occur under different conditions.
Wi|Mi consists of two subcases:
• No-fork win: No conflicting blocks are proposed by the
rest of the network during the propagation of node i’s
block.
• Fork win: Conflicting blocks are proposed by the rest of
the network during the propagation of node i’s block,
whereas node i’s block still wins.
The probability of no-fork win equals to PNC,i(∞), as is
evaluated by (3). The probability of fork win is slightly more
complicated. During the propagation of node i’s block, the
number of conflicting blocks generated by the rest of network
at time slot (t, t+ δ] conforms to a Bernoulli distribution with
rate |Ui(t)|M . If node j happens to generate a competing
block during (t, t + δ], node i’s block will need to win the
support of the majority computing power of the network before
it encounters node j’s block in a stalemate. We denote the
chance of node i winning the fork under this condition by
ωij(t). Therefore:
E[Wi|Mi]
= E[Wi, no-fork win|Mi] + E[Wi, fork win|Mi]
= lim
t→∞PNC,i(t) +
∞∑
t=δ
PNC,i(t)
∑
j∈Ui(t)
pijωij(t)
(10)
Notably, in the derivation above we only considered two-prong
forks for simplifying the analysis; likelihood of three or more-
prong forks is negligible compared to that of two-prong forks.
In contrast, the conditional event Wi|Mj in (9) can only
happen via a fork race. That is, node i needs to generate a
Fig. 3. Explanation of (12). Light blue (grey) area denotes portion of the
network that advocates i’s (j’s) block. ωˆij(t) is evaluated by the total
computing power portion covered by light blue area at stalemate.
competing block during the propagation of node j’s block,
and eventually wins the fork race. Similarly to (10), we have:
E[Wi|Mj ] = E[Wi, fork win|Mj ]
=
∞∑
t=δ
PNC,j(t)pii1{i∈Uj(t)}
(
1− ωji(t)
) (11)
1{i∈Uj(t)} is an indicator function, returning 1 if the condition
holds true; 0 otherwise. The winning chance of node i under
this circumstance is 1− ωji(t).
Evaluating ωij(t). ωij(t) essentially measures the
communication advantage of node i over j when j generates
a competing block which starts the fork race. For i to win the
fork race against j, it has to have the majority of the network
advocate its block before the two competing blocks end up
in a stalemate. Let the moment when i publishes its block be
time 0. Define τik(t) as the minimum time for i’s block to
propagate to node k starting from time t. Then ωij(t) can
be estimated as follows:
ωˆij(t) =
∑
k
pik
pi
(
1{τik(t)<τjk(0)} +
1
2
1{τik(t)=τjk(0)}
)
(12)
Figure 3 explains the calculation of ωˆij(t). As a result, we
can finally obtain E[Wi] by substituting (1), (10), (11), (12)
into (9).
C. Security Analysis
We consider all nodes are honest-but-potentially-colluding.
The fork rate FR provides an overall measure of how much
mining power is wasted, while the 50%-attack threshold AT50
measures the system’s security in the worst case scenario that
the colluding group consists of the highest mining revenue
earners. Next we analyze how network connectivity impacts
FR and AT50.
1) Lower overall network connectivity leads to higher FR
and lower AT50, thus weaker consensus security: We assume
the block generation rate pii is fixed for any node i. First,
lower overall network connectivity means it takes longer for
any node to disseminate a new block across the network. This
can be caused by a protocol change that lowers the minimum
peer number requirement. For the calculation in (2) (3), this
leads to a higher |Ui(s)|pi , lower limt→∞ PNC,i(t),∀i, and
thus higher FR. Moreover, a lower limt→∞ PNC,i(t) means
that more of MRi is contributed by fork races and the
distribution of mining revenue is deeper influenced by each
node’s communication capability. As a result, MRi moves
farther from piipi and AT50 moves lower.
6Notably, for a certain network connectivity profile, higher
block generation rate across all nodes (thus a higher pi) would
lead to a higher |Ui(s)|pi,∀i and have the same impact of
lower overall network connectivity.
2) Higher heterogeneity of network connectivity also leads
to lower AT50: We still assume the block generation rate pii,∀i
is fixed. Higher heterogeneity of network connectivity means
there is a greater divergence of communication capability
among nodes. For instance, if node i resides in a highly-
connected cluster in the network while node j resides in a
sparsely-connected region, i will have a significant commu-
nication advantage over nodes in the sparse network region
including j. As a result, i can disseminate a block to majority
of the network much faster than j. ωˆij(t), as is evaluated
by (12), will be close to 1 and ωˆji(t) will be much lower
than 0.5. Therefore, i can harvest more mining revenue from
fork races than j or other nodes in sparse network region.
Consequently, E[Wi] climbs higher above piipi and E[Wj ] drops
lower below pijpi . This ultimately results in a more unequal MR
distribution and hence lower AT50.
V. INCORPORATING NETWORK CONNECTIVITY INTO
SELFISH MINING ANALYSIS
In this section we evaluate the impact of network con-
nectivity on selfish mining pool’s communication capability
and analyze its security implication under an expanding-
consortium setting.
A. Selfish Mining Strategy
The core idea of selfish mining is to withhold newly
generated blocks in a private chain, and release the private
chain when the selfish mining pool sees the honest chain
catch up close enough with the private chain. The detailed
selfish mining strategy is illustrated in Figure 4, which we
replicated from [14] and added with more description. Let α,
β be the computing power share of the selfish mining pool
and the honest nodes. Then α = piSM/pi and β = 1 − α,
where piSM is the selfish mining pool’s block generation
rate. The state number denotes the private chain’s lead over
the honest chain. State transition is triggered by any block
generation event. Transitions from state 1 to 0′ and 2 to 0 are
accompanied by the selfish mining pool’s releasing the private
chain. Any transition destined to state 0 marks a canonization
event. γSM is defined as the long-term average fraction of
honest computing power that will advocate the selfish mining
pool’s private chain when the pool and an honest miner release
competing blocks simultaneously.
To incorporate network connectivity into the analysis, we
model the selfish mining pool’s network function as follows:
• Information exchanges within the selfish mining pool are
instantaneous. The pool members are fully connected and
synchronized. Any pool member who receives a new
block from an honest node can make decision (changing
state, switching chain, publishing the private chain) on
behave of the entire pool.
• Once the selfish mining strategy determines to release the
private chain, all pool members release the private chain
to all peers simultaneously.
Fig. 4. Selfish mining strategy in [14]. State number denotes the private
chain’s lead over the honest chain. State transition is triggered by block
generation.
• Selfish mining pool members still relay blocks for honest
miners, as long as the block does not trigger the pool to
release its private chain. The reason is two-fold for the
pool: to avoid suspicion of being a “blackhole” attacker,
and to avoid network partitioning which would paralyze
the blockchain system altogether.
Based on this model, we consider γSM the selfish mining
pool’s communication capability measure and evaluate it from
the network connectivity profile.
B. Evaluating γSM Using Betweenness Centrality
Based on the assumption that nodes in the selfish min-
ing pool are synchronous and can communicate with each
other instantaneously, we treat these pool nodes as a fully-
interconnected cluster and equivalently a super node denoted
by SMPOOL, which preserves the pool members’ all external
communication links to the remaining honest nodes. We show
that a betweenness centrality measure of SMPOOL within the
network accurately evaluates γSM .
Proposition 2: γSM can be evaluated by the mining power
weighted betweenness centrality measure of SMPOOL:
γSM =∑
i 6=SMPOOL
pii
pi − piSM
∑
j 6=i6=SMPOOL
pij
pi − piSM − pii
σ(i, j|SMPOOL)
σ(i, j)
(13)
wherein σ(i, j) is the number of shortest paths between i and
j, and σ(i, j|SMPOOL) is the number of such paths that pass
through SMPOOL.
A proof sketch: Let i and j denote a pair of honest
nodes, with i being the miner of a new block which triggers
SMPOOL to release its private chain according to the selfish-
mine strategy. For j to switch to SMPOOL’s private chain
instead of accepting i’s new block, the highest block of
SMPOOL’s private chain must be propagated to j before i’s
new block. In the graph model, this is necessitated by SMPOOL
residing on a shortest communication path between i and
j. Therefore, σ(i,j|SMPOOL)σ(i,j) gives the likelihood that SMPOOL
delivers its private chain to j ahead of i’s block. The weight
pii
pi−piSM
pij
pi−piSM−pii evaluates the pair (i, j)’s mining power
contribution to γSM among all pairs of honest nodes. As
a result, the mining power weighted betweenness centrality
measure of SMPOOL computes the average fraction of hon-
est mining power that will advocate SMPOOL’s block after
7SMPOOL releases its private chain, thus accurately evaluates
γSM .
Equation (13) can be conveniently computed with the Bran-
des algorithm [20]. If there are M honest nodes and they have
equal mining power, i.e. pii = pi−piSMM ,∀i 6= SM , then the
weight piipi−piSM ·
pij
pi−piSM−pii becomes
1
M(M−1) and (13) reduces
to the standard normalized betweenness centrality measure.
With γSM obtained, the calculation of the selfish mining
pool’s mining revenue follows the procedure of [14]. Notably,
the mining revenue of pool is proportional to γSM .
C. Security Analysis
We consider the selfish mining pool as an expanding
consortium among the network of honest nodes. Under this
setting, we discuss how network connectivity affects γSM and
consensus security w.r.t. security thresholds AT50 and PRTH.
1) Lower overall network connectivity leads to higher γSM ,
lower AT50, and lower PRTH, thus less secure against selfish
mining: Lower overall network connectivity leads to reduced
communication capability of both the selfish mining pool and
honest nodes. However, since the selfish mining pool consists
of originally honest nodes and preserve all their external
communication links, communication capability reduction of
an average honest node will be more significant than that of
SMPOOL. Therefore, SMPOOL will be residing in the shortest
communication paths of more honest pairs if the overall
network connectivity lowers, yielding a higher γSM for every
α value. Consequently this yields lower AT50 and PRTH.
2) Compared to AT50, PRTH is more sensitive to network
connectivity changes: According to [14], PRTH is reached
much earlier than AT50 for any γSM . Due to the gradualism of
selfish mining pool’s expansion, the rate of the selfish mining
pool harvesting new external communication links initially
increases, then gradually slows down as the pool takes in
more nodes. Thus as α grows from 0 to 50%, γSM grows
quickly at first then slow down as it comes closer to 1. Also
the mining revenue of selfish mining pool is proportional
to γSM . Therefore, a moderate reduction of overall network
connectivity would lead to significant decrease in PRTH, but
limited decrease in AT50. PRTH is also a more practical
security measure than AT50 in the sense that once the pool
size hits PRTH, joining the pool will be financially attractive
to the remaining honest nodes in the network.
3) Selfish mining pool can take advantage of heterogeneity
of network connectivity to achieve lower AT50 and PRTH: If
the selfish mining pool is aware of the peer-to-peer network’s
topology, it can prioritize its expansion into well-connected
regions of the network to maximize the growth of γSM and
its mining revenue. As a result, heterogeneity of network
connectivity can be exploited by selfish mining pool to achieve
lower AT50 and PRTH.
VI. EVALUATION
We conducted simulation experiments to validate our model
and security analysis. The simulation program was written
in Python and follows a time-driven fashion and takes the
following as input: graph representation of the network, block
(a) GR(1000, 4) (b) GR(1000, 4)F10 (c) GE(1000, 4)
(d) GR(100, 4) (e) GR(1000, 8)F10 (f) GE(1000, 8)
Fig. 5. Visualization of six network graphs used in our experiments. Dot
represents mining node, grey line segment represents communication link.
generation rates of all nodes, adversarial setting (honest or
selfish mining), and simulation time (slots).
A. Setup
We use three types of network graph for evaluation with the
following notations:
• GR(N,D): a regular graph with N nodes and degree D.
• GR(N,D)FX : a GR(N,D) but with the first X% of
nodes being fully-interconnected.
• GE(N,D): a graph with N nodes and exponentially
distributed node degrees with an average D.
The latter two graph types are designed to simulate different
heterogeneous network connectivity profiles. The six network
graphs used in our experiments are visualized in Figure 5 with
Python package NetworkX [21]. To evaluate the impact of
network connectivity and provide a fair ground for compar-
ing security thresholds, we assign all nodes the same block
generation rate: pii = piN ,∀i while using pi as a system input.
The following metrics are used for evaluation: FR, AT50
and PRTH as security metrics, rooted mean square error
(RMSE) between analytical RMG distribution and simulated
RMG distribution as the model accuracy metric.
B. Honest Mining Experiment
We performed eight experiments on four network graphs
with different settings. Each experiment was run for 10 million
timeslots. The configuration and evaluation results are shown
in Table II and the RMG histograms are shown in Figure 6.
We made the following observations:
1) The analytical RMG result conservatively estimates the
simulation result. The accuracy improves when pi decreases
or D increases. For instance, the obvious gap between
analytical result and simulation in Figure 6(e) demonstrates
the fully-interconnected top-10% nodes have a significantly
higher block winning chance than that expected by E[Wi].
Nonetheless, as is shown in Table II, for either graph type
when pi decreases from 0.1 to 0.05 or D increases from 4 to
8(a) GE(1000, 4), pi = 0.1 (b) GE(1000, 4), pi = 0.05 (c) GE(1000, 8), pi = 0.1 (d) GE(1000, 8), pi = 0.05
(e) GR(1000, 4)F10, pi = 0.1 (f) GR(1000, 4)F10, pi = 0.05 (g) GR(1000, 8)F10, pi = 0.1 (h) GR(1000, 8)F10, pi = 0.05
Fig. 6. Relative mining gain (RMG) results of eight experiments.
TABLE II
HONEST MINING EXPERIMENT RESULT CORRESPONDING TO FIGURE 6
Configuration Metrics
Graph(N,D) pi FR-SIM FR-ANA AT50-SIM AT50-ANA RMSE
a GE(1000, 4) 0.1 0.3148 0.3136 459/1000 470/1000 0.0325
b GE(1000, 4) 0.05 0.1773 0.1670 478/1000 484/1000 0.0205
c GE(1000, 8) 0.1 0.2409 0.2248 475/1000 479/1000 0.0187
d GE(1000, 8) 0.05 0.1315 0.1159 487/1000 489/1000 0.0123
e GR(1000, 4)F10 0.1 0.3117 0.3099 457/1000 470/1000 0.0423
f GR(1000, 4)F10 0.05 0.1758 0.1649 479/1000 485/1000 0.0232
g GR(1000, 8)F10 0.1 0.2309 0.2124 480/1000 484/1000 0.0195
h GR(1000, 8)F10 0.05 0.1250 0.1090 490/1000 491/1000 0.0113
8, the fork rate decreases and so does RMSE. This validates
Proposition 1 that the estimation accuracy improves when fork
rate drops.
2) FR decreases and AT50 increases when pi decreases or
D increases. This validates the security analysis in IV-C that
higher overall network connectivity or lower block generation
rate leads to stronger consensus security in the presence of
potentially colluding nodes.
C. Selfish Mining Experiment
We switched the adversary setting from honest to selfish
mining and performed three experiments. Each experiment
targeted a certain network graph and consisted of seven simu-
lations, each took an α value from {2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 45}%
and ran for 10 million timeslots. Figure 7(a) shows the ana-
lytical result of γSM . The configuration and evaluation results
are shown in Table III and Figure 7(b). For graph GE(1000, 4)
we configured the selfish mining pool to expand from the
highest-degree node to lower-degree nodes in a descending
order. This was purposed as an example of selfish mining
pool’s expansion strategy. RMSE here measures the averaged
estimation accuracy of the analytical RMG over all the seven
α values.
To estimate the thresholds AT50 and PRTH, for each of the
three experiments we fitted the simulated RMG points using
degree-7 polynomials and obtained AT50 and PRTH using the
fitted curve. The following observations are made:
1) The analytical result matches simulation. The close
match between analytical RMG results and simulation results
in Figure 7(b) validates our betweenness centrality-based
calculation of γSM .
2) When N decreases from 1000 to 100, PRTH changes
more dramatically than AT50. This validates our security
analysis that PRTH is more sensitive to network connectivity
changes. Particularly, the analytical curves of γSM in Figure
7(a) demonstrates that as the selfish mining pool size expands
from α = 0 to α = 50%, γSM grows quickly at first then
gradually slows down when it comes closer to 1.
3) As is shown in Figure 7(a), γSM rapidly crosses above
the PRTH curve and grows close to 1 when the selfish mining
pool expands in GE(1000, 4). This demonstrates the feasi-
bility for selfish mining pool to choose a particular expansion
strategy to exploit the heterogeneity of network connectivity
for faster revenue growth.
9(a) Analytical γSM . (b) Analytical RMG and simulation.
Fig. 7. Comparison of simulation and analytical result for selfish mining.
TABLE III
SELFISH MINING EXPERIMENT RESULT CORRESPONDING TO FIGURE 7
Configuration Metrics
Graph (N,D) pi PRTH-SIM PRTH-ANA AT50-SIM AT50-ANA RMSE
1 GE(1000, 4) 0.01 52/1000 55/1000 369/1000 369/1000 0.0290
2 GR(1000, 4) 0.01 122/1000 114/1000 368/1000 370/1000 0.0338
3 GR(100, 4) 0.01 22/100 21/100 38/100 38/100 0.0311
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
On Potential Model Deficiency: In our model we only
consider two-prong forks. That is, at most two blocks of the
same height could be propagating in the network concurrently.
Though the possibility of three-prong forks or more is signif-
icantly lower than two-prong forks, it could still affect the
long-term mining revenue distribution, especially when the
network is large and block propagation delays are high. To
tackle this we would need a more delicate model that accounts
the progress of all competing branches in a fork.
On Model Practicality: In practical blockchain networks, it
can be challenging to monitor the block propagation progress
(i.e. Ui(t)). To overcome this difficulty, a block propagation
progress-agnostic model is needed to estimate the commu-
nication capability and forecast the revenue of a node via
congregate network statistics. Furthermore, the permissionless
network is structurally volatile and may conform to a scale-
free expansion pattern [7]. It is possible to model structural
changes of the network with a certain random process and
evaluate its impact on information propagation and consen-
sus security. The impact of a selfish mining pool’s internal
communication routine is also a potential issue to explore.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented a modeling study on the impact of network
connectivity on consensus security of PoW blockchain un-
der two adversarial scenarios, namely honest-but-potentially-
colluding and selfish mining. For the first scenario, we
demonstrated the communication advantage of a node over its
competitors in a fork race and provided a method to estimate
its long-term mining revenue and relative mining gain. For
the second scenario, we introduced a practical model for the
selfish mining pool’s network functions and showed that the
communication capability of selfish mining pool, γSM , can
be accurately evaluated by the mining power-weighted be-
tweenness centrality measure. For both scenarios, we showed
that low network connectivity and excessive heterogeneity of
network connectivity lead to poor consensus security. Our
modeling and analysis can serve as a paradigm for assessing
the security impact of various factors in a distributed consensus
system. In future work we will incorporate more realistic
network settings into our model and extend the analysis to
other blockchain systems.
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